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Requirements for a decent life are to be found in the dimensions both of human 
time and ecological space. While the latter has attracted attention from some 
global justice theorists, the former is a comparably neglected matter. This paper 
aims to integrate temporal and ecological perspectives in order to provide an 
enriched conceptual framework for grasping what global justice means today. 
We begin by showing that while contemporary political philosophy tends to 
assume a somewhat undifferentiated conception of time, treating temporal justice 
as a future-oriented concern distinct from issues of intra-generational justice, 
there are richer understandings to be found in some influential schools of critical 
social theory. Drawing then, particularly, on Alf Hornborg’s theory of ‘unequal 
exchange of time and space’, and supplementing this with insights from David 
Harvey, we analyse three ways in which disadvantage can be perpetrated in the 
dimension of time. We then show how those categories of temporal disadvantage 
broadly correspond with the three basic rights identified by Henry Shue. On this 
basis, we claim there is a strong argument for regarding temporality as an 
integral aspect of global justice here and now, for the generation already – 
although too often precariously – living. 
 
Keywords: global justice; time and space; ecological space; time-space compression; 
unequal exchange; basic rights 
 
Introduction 
There are dramatic inequalities globally. Within political theory there are different 
views on whether or how this might be a matter of injustice. In this paper we  focus on 
an aspect of inequality that involves people being advantaged or disadvantaged in 
relation to each other. We take one party to be advantaged in relation to another if the 
one enjoys a net balance of benefits over burdens arising from a common set of 
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circumstances while the other bears a net balance of burdens over benefits. We do not 
assume that one party being advantaged over another is in itself necessarily unjust, for 
we do not assume that any kind of inequality is necessarily unjust. The only kind of 
situation we do consider presumptively to require redress as a matter of justice is one 
of common circumstances in which some people have less than sufficient access to 
the means for a decent life while others have more than enough. In what follows we 
contribute to a framing of those circumstances that focuses the question of justice in a 
distinctive way. 
 Our aim is not to specify in close particulars the sufficient conditions for a 
decent life, but to highlight in more general terms how these can be conceptualised in 
the distinct yet intimately interconnected dimensions of space and time. The need for 
space, and space with certain qualities, to live in, is generally recognised as of 
fundamental significance for political philosophy, as are questions of justice in 
relation to the spatial dimension of resources: for material resources physically 
occupy space, and rights in relation to them are understood to involve various kinds of 
spatial distributions, including territorial and ecological. The dimension of time, by 
contrast, has figured less prominently in discussions of political theory, particularly in 
relation to theories of global justice. Yet everything that exists exists in time, and just 
as we can distinguish different kinds of space, so we can also think in terms of 
different temporalities: not only are there different scales along which time has 
significance for us – e.g. the geological, the historical, the generational, the annual, 
and the momentary – there can also be significant nonsynchronicities within and 
between societies that affect different people in normatively significant ways. 
 So when we speak of sufficient access to the means of a minimally decent life 
we understand these not only in terms of the ecological space that furnishes our 
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material requirements but also in terms of the comparably neglected matter of human 
time. However, we do not assume that there is some uniquely determinate way of 
saying if or when a person has sufficient time, and we do not assume time is plausibly 
regarded as a ‘metric’ of justice. Nor do we assume that human temporality, any more 
than ecological space, can be reduced to mere physical dimensionality. 
 A question, accordingly, is how temporal considerations can appropriately be 
integrated into an account of global justice.  
 This question has not figured prominently in the philosophical literature. 
However, as we show in Section 1, some helpful insights are to be found in the work 
of critical social theorists, including David Harvey and Alf Hornborg, who integrate 
spatial and temporal dimensions into their conceptual framework. Such work yields a 
basis for understanding relationships between different temporalities and appreciating 
how in social relations there can be significant sorts of interchangeability between 
space and time insofar as questions of social access and control are concerned. On 
that basis we can appreciate the pivotal role, in linking to normative concerns about 
advantage and disadvantage, played by the idea of unequal exchange of time and 
space. Thus, as we discuss in Section 2, although the idea of unequal exchange has no 
place within mainstream economics, it can meaningfully be applied to aggregate 
movements of energy and materials in the context of time-space compression that 
technological advances have brought into being. We integrate Hornborg’s account of 
this with the conceptualisation by David Harvey of how the territorial logic of 
unequal exchange relates to the distinct capitalist logic of accumulation. We are 
thereby able to appreciate how global inequalities can involve disadvantages in the 
dimension both of ecological space and human time. 
4 
 While the question of what it means to be disadvantaged with respect to 
ecological space has been discussed extensively elsewhere (cf. Hayward 2006, 2008, 
2009), the question of how global inequality manifests injustice with respect to time 
has received less attention. The analysis we offer in Section 3 suggests that there are 
at least three distinctive ways in which disadvantage or exploitation can be 
perpetrated in the dimension of time. We then show, in Section 4, how those three 
concepts of disadvantage in time broadly correspond with the three kinds of basic 
rights identified by Henry Shue (1996) that mark the threshold the sinking below 
which triggers a requirement of justice to redress.  
 Our argument is thus that by analysing the different ways in which time is 
important for the quality of a life, and, indeed, constitutive for the experience of life at 
all, the framing of questions of global justice can be enriched with its inclusion. In 
conclusion we emphasise a practical motivation for this argument. When political 
philosophers think about temporality, it is most often as a question concerning 
responsibilities with regard to the future – a question of intergenerational justice. Our 
emphasis is on how temporality should be regarded as an integral aspect of global 
justice here and now, for the generation already living, and prematurely dying. 
 
1. Conceptualising the circumstances of global injustice: recognising the role of 
temporality in a dynamic account  
In this section we consider, in general terms, how temporality can be brought to figure 
in a characterisation of the circumstances of global justice, or injustice. The 
dimension of space standardly forms part of the characterisation, featuring in ideas of 
rights over territory, for instance, and in a more general acknowledgement that 
benefits and burdens relating to spatial distribution of resources provide part of the 
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subject matter for an account of justice. The dimension of time, by contrast, has been 
less fully integrated. The contemporary philosophical literature on global justice does 
not accord particular prominence to the question we are addressing here. When the 
dimension of time does figure, this is most often in relation to concerns about the 
rights or welfare of future generations, or about obligations with regard to the future. 
Relatedly, we find some critical discussion of whether future costs and benefits can 
justifiably be discounted relative to present values. Recently, concerns about the 
potential threats that our technological interventions in the natural order may be 
creating have led to questions being asked about whether a precautionary principle in 
regard to future-orientated actions might be appropriate. The problem of climate 
change, furthermore, has been seen to highlight how temporal delays between the 
causes and the effects of serious harms can result in asymmetries – between causing 
or benefiting from carbon gas emissions and bearing the burdens or paying the costs 
of their effects – that have implications for distributive justice.  
In all such discussions, however, a quite simple conceptualisation of 
temporality is assumed: discussions are framed in terms of what happened in the past, 
what is happening now, and what we should ethically aim to do in the future. In one 
way, this might seem entirely unremarkable: time is a constitutive condition of the 
existence of all of us, its flow carries us all along together, and its arrow is in a single 
direction: there is a past, when our ancestors lived; a present, when we live; and a 
future, when our descendants will live. Furthermore, it is also assumed that questions 
of intergenerational justice are distinct from those of contemporary global justice, 
because in the one case the people concerned are separated in time and in the other 
they are separated in space. These two assumptions, namely, that time can be 
regarded as a unitary flow carrying all along with it in contemporaneity, and that 
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temporal relations are entirely distinct from spatial ones, are subject to interesting 
kinds of scrutiny in the traditions of critical social theory that we shall draw on. But 
we will first establish why there is a need for scrutiny. 
To understand better what the concern is we shall introduce it by way of its 
analogue in the dimension of space; on that basis we will go further to note also the 
substantive connection between the two.  
Space, purely as a dimension, is probably of little interest to anyone except 
some advanced physicists. Although we all ‘need space’ in a variety of contexts, each 
of the needs is for something other than the empty dimensionality of pure extension. 
There is enough physical space on the surface area of Los Angeles to fit all the people 
alive today. Pressed into that space we would no longer be alive, of course, but nor 
would we remain alive if we were relocated to the more ample territorial space of an 
inhospitable region like Antarctica or the Sahara. The point is that it is not 
extensionality, but the resources and ‘ecological services’ required for human survival 
and flourishing that really matter. This is to refer to the cluster of ideas developed 
more fully elsewhere in terms of a concept of ‘ecological space’ (cf. Hayward 2013). 
This is defined in terms not of homogeneous three-dimensional extension but of the 
various functionalities nature furnishes in various configurations that constitute 
‘niches’ for different species populations, any number of which might be found within 
a single three-dimensional space. The ‘realised niche’ of humanity – i.e. the actual 
totality of ecological space humans have come to utilise – now far exceeds what 
would constitute our ‘fundamental niche’ absent the extraordinary enhancement of 
our natural powers to adapt our environment through technological developments. 
This has now happened to such an extent that not only do we seriously encroach on 
the niches of other species – driving multitudes of them to extinction through habitat 
7 
loss and other deleterious ecological changes – but we also become increasingly 
reliant on technology to cope with our own changing environment. Space as it 
concerns social scientists or political philosophers, then, is not simply a container for 
human activities; the space that matters to us is constituted by specific valuable 
functionings; because these are not inexhaustibly abundant, there is competition for 
access to them. For this reason, access to ecological space is a matter of justice. 
 So how is temporality a matter of justice? The first thing to note is that any 
functionally describable kind of space is itself temporal. Thus ecological space is 
inherently temporal in all its constituent processes. In fact, these processes unfold 
with myriad differentiated temporalities, from sub-atomic events, through the 
reproduction of cells, to the life cycle of an organism, the succession of ecological 
communities, and developments of planetary cycles such as carbon and water, and the 
climate conditions as a whole. Thus, a human life – which exists in a complex 
metabolism of all such processes together with further complex processes of 
psychology and social relationships – can be looked at from a variety of temporal 
perspectives. This means that different aspects of human life and flourishing are 
subject to different temporalities. Questions of justice can potentially arise whenever 
choices have to be made between different actions that involve different temporal 
advantages and disadvantages for different people. 
 We can build the account further by referring to two kinds of insight that are in 
fact well developed within literatures of critical social theory. These relate to what we 
shall refer to as ‘temporal differentiation’  and ‘time-space interchangeability’. 
 The general idea of temporal differentiation can apply in a variety of more 
complex ways, but at its simplest the idea is that some people will be ‘ahead’ and 
some ‘behind’ with regard to any tangible criterion of temporal development.1 Quite 
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typically, the criterion will be the degree of technological advance availed of. Today, 
for instance, while developed countries are dominated by the motor car, many people 
elsewhere still depend on draught animals, if they are even lucky enough to have 
these, while others are already living in a post-petroleum future of solar-powered 
vehicles. Temporal differentiation, in this sense of ‘non-synchronicity’, can involve 
quite significant asymmetries – in terms of access to basic goods and discretionary 
time – within global generations. 
 A question is whether these asymmetries can amount to differences of 
advantage and disadvantage that come within the purview of justice and even human 
rights concerns. Taken in isolation, they might not. The simple fact that some achieve 
a particular development prior in time to some others can be regarded not only as 
unobjectionable but even as positively desirable insofar as it may open opportunities 
for others to follow or, indeed, leapfrog. What can be more problematic is the sort of 
situation in which the good achieved by the first developer is zero sum or even 
negative sum: in such situations, those who would follow can be impeded from 
pursuing their own development path, or even set back. The question of whether and 
when temporal differentiation prompts concerns of justice, then, is sensitive to such 
empirical matters. While a normative theorist cannot be expected to settle empirical 
questions, it does behove us to reflect on the empirical assumptions we make when 
setting out a theory that is intended to have some potential application in real contexts 
of global justice. 
 To this end, it is appropriate also to integrate the second key insight from the 
critical literature. This is that at a certain level of generality, and for certain purposes, 
space and time can be regarded as interchangeable. If this is illustrated by the thought 
that, for instance, one might go from the horse-drawn age to the motor age by, say, 
9 
moving from rural Azerbajan to America, the theoretically significant point concerns 
the more fundamental circumstances that make this possible. For whether we regard 
such a transition as spatial or temporal – which, in a sense, is a matter of a kind of 
Gestalt shift – what is substantively significant is one’s altered collocation within a 
global configuration of social relations. Alterations of social relationships can be 
brought about in many different ways, and with different distributions of satisfaction, 
welfare, and so on. Technology, as it becomes more sophisticated, facilitates ever 
more dramatic alterations that can be tracked in both temporal and spatial dimensions. 
An influential version of this general thesis is provided by David Harvey’s (1989) 
concept of time-space compression, referring to how the temporal acceleration of 
economic activity diminishes spatial barriers and distances. This is especially evident 
in global markets for commodities, currencies, and financial products, where 
movements at the speed of electrons can alter the basic conditions of livelihoods of 
masses of people. While global markets allow capital movement to be synchronised to 
the nano-second, lived realities do not share in this unified temporality. Yet the 
massive transfers can have extensive implications for real people living in real 
ecological space: fluctuations in commodity prices, for instance, can make the 
difference between a thriving livelihood and poverty for many people engaged in 
primary production. Extensive command over ecological space, and thereby also over 
the livelihoods of people, can thus be concentrated in the relatively few hands that 
control global movements of capital.  
 Even the fact that social arrangements can exploit the interchangeability of 
space and time is not in itself necessarily problematic, however, for it can be regarded 
as a potential source of considerable benefit to humans. The inequality that is 
stimulated along with it can be seen as a natural tendency of global economic 
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arrangements because of their inherent dynamic. Since innovation leads to advantage, 
unevenness of prosperity is a straightforward consequence. This in itself does not 
preclude the innovation yielding a positive sum outcome so that even the less 
advantaged do better than they did before. Hence the standard liberal view on global 
inequality is that there is nothing inherently wrong with it, and correctives to it only 
need to be applied when an inequality is also unjust in some more specific way. Time-
space compression, then, is in principle something that all people might benefit from, 
for it opens the possibility that we all might get more out of the natural conditions of 
our existence, thanks to our technological leveraging of its capacities, than we 
otherwise would. This, indeed, is what is generally meant by progress in our culture. 
Hence the role for normative theory, on this view, is to suggest adjustments to 
distributive outcomes where the benefit to humans in aggregate does not quite 
conform to what a theory of justice would commend, while, of course, examining in 
detail what theory of justice should be the basis of the commendation.  
 But if we cannot assume time-space compression necessarily leads to injustice, 
we should also not simply assume the contrary. Particularly because of the 
possibilities of leverage it exploits, differences of advantage that may initially seem 
innocuous can be compounded into much more egregious differences. Insofar as such 
a process is dynamic and systematic, there is a possibility of its being impervious to 
attempts at amelioration that do not get to its roots. We therefore cannot rule out the 
possibility that temporal differentiation – as manifest especially in uneven 
development – can be unjust, and in systematic ways, as a result of time-space 
compression. We certainly need to avail of a theoretical perspective that allows us to 
comprehend such potential circumstances of injustice. Since Alf Hornborg offers a 
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helpful outline of such a perspective, we shall draw on that in the account offered in 
the next section. 
 
2. The unequal exchange of time and space 
A critical perspective on the circumstances of global justice that allows integration of 
the dimensions both of space and time in an account of social relations has at its core 
the idea of unequal exchange. This is an idea that does not have a place in mainstream 
economic thinking: the exchange of socially productive resources cannot be thought 
of as ‘unequal’ as long as it is conducted on the basis of parties’ free agreement and 
price is understood to be the value defined by the free play of market forces. 
Hornborg (2003, pp. 5R-6L) recognises that ‘there is no specifiable relation between 
the amount of productive potential that has been invested in a commodity and the way 
it will be evaluated on the market’. However, he believes unequal exchange can be 
conceptualised without recourse to the notion of value, if we step back and observe 
the geographical movements of the usable energy and material resources that are vital 
for economic development and our life-support systems. What such observations can 
reveal is how, when savings of space and time, made possible by technology, are 
experienced in one part of the world, someone else in the world system can be losing 
time or space in the process. The phenomena of time-space compression that Harvey 
observes, claims Hornborg (2006, p. 80R), presuppose a process of ‘time-space 
appropriation’. Time-space compression in one region of the world requires time-
space appropriation elsewhere. On this basis we are able to conceptualise uneven 
development not just as a matter of differential lead-times in reaching certain 
milestones of development but as a more structural kind of inequality. 
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 From the perspective developed by Hornborg, through the inter-societal 
exchange of hours of labour (human time), on the one hand, and access to raw 
materials, energy, hectares of land/water and waste sinks (ecological space2), on the 
other, affluent industrialised societies are seen to gain ever greater command over 
these socially productive resources while poor underdeveloped societies are, to that 
extent, left with less development potential. In explicating this process, Hornborg 
draws on the work of ecological economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1975) to 
highlight the significance of what the Second Law of Thermodynamics tells us about 
entropy as an index of disorder and (un)available energy: higher entropy means 
greater disorder and lower productive potential, while lower entropy means greater 
order and higher productive potential. Configurations of matter, too, can be more or 
less ‘orderly’ – and thus conveniently available for human productive use – and their 
dissipative transformations in processes of industrial production are analogous to the 
increase of entropic energy. Since production processes are subject to the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics, finished products represent an increase in entropy and disorder, 
compared to the resources they are produced from. Thus what is thought of from an 
economic perspective as an investment of human time and ecological space can be 
seen, from the material perspective, to involve the dissipation of energy and order: the 
productive potentials brought into use in production processes cannot be employed 
again.  
 Hornborg claims that if the industrialised economies of affluent societies, 
characterised by their ‘dissipative structures’, have been able to seem immune to 
entropic consequences such as environmental degradation, this is because their 
internal order is maintained by importing low-entropy matter-energy (in the form of 
various raw material resources) from, while exporting high-entropy matter-energy (in 
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the form of industrial commodities and waste) to, the less developed parts of the 
world. A key point is that the price of finished products does not reflect an evaluation 
of what it would take to restore the original productive potential that has been 
dissipated through production processes. In fact, he argues, if we take a longitudinal 
view of the transformation of natural resources into marketable industrial products, 
there appears, in aggregate, to be an inverse correlation between price and productive 
potential: the higher entropy and the greater disorder products/commodities generate 
through their production processes and the lower productive potential is left in them, 
the higher market price they gain: 
‘in order to stay in business, of course, every industrialist will have to be paid more 
money for his products than he spends on fuels and raw materials. At an 
aggregated level, then, this means that the more resources that have been dissipated 
by industry today, the more new resources it will be able to purchase tomorrow. 
(Hornborg 2001, p. 45)  
Hornborg thus believes that, as an inevitable consequence of the entropy law and 
market exchange, ‘industrial centers exporting high-utility commodities will 
automatically gain access to ever greater amounts of available energy from their 
hinterlands’ (2003, p. 6R), while those ‘hinterlands’ that are more directly involved in 
resource extraction, on the other side of the story, are exploited both as sources of 
productive potentials (human time and ecological space) and as sinks of entropy 
(industrial commodities and valueless waste). 
 Hornborg’s concern is to lay bare the basic mechanism that generates an inter-
societal exchange of human time and ecological space. His analysis helps us 
appreciate, in general terms, how geographical movements – particularly between 
affluent societies and poor societies – are generated through processes of 
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accumulation. In doing so, he sets out what David Harvey refers to as the ‘territorial 
logic’ of global capital accumulation. This, however, as Harvey (2005, pp. 91-92) 
emphasises, is one of two distinct logics that are intertwined in the process of global 
capital accumulation – namely, a territorial logic and a capitalist logic. Under the 
territorial logic, political governments strive to ‘take advantage of the asymmetries 
that arise out of spatial exchange relations’ (p. 92) for the collective advantage of the 
national society: this means aiming to attract material benefits to the nation’s territory. 
The working of this logic results in the unequal inter-societal exchange of socially 
productive resources. Under the capitalist logic, those with command of capital 
deploy it wherever profit is best attained, because they ‘seek individual advantage and 
are responsible to no one except themselves and (to some degree) shareholders’ (p. 
91). Following this logic, the economic power to command the productive 
infrastructure accumulated through the inter-societal exchange transcends the 
territorial borders of societies and concentrates into the hands of those who command 
capital.  
 The two logics do not generate identical incidences of advantage and 
disadvantage. Due to the territorial logic, there are workers, in affluent and rapidly 
developing societies, who – as long as capital finds propitious domestic outlets – can 
be seen as beneficiaries of the global economy. Due to the capitalist logic, there are 
affluent minorities in poor countries, and the individuals concerned may or may not 
be drawn from previously dominant territorial elites. Meanwhile, the majority of 
workers in poor and developing societies are on the disadvantaged side of both logics 
and make up the mass of the global poor.  
 It makes sense, then, to understand as the Global Affluent those who are 
advantaged by either the territorial or the capitalist logic, and to see the Global Poor 
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as those who are disadvantaged by both. In keeping with other normative approaches 
that aim to protect the least advantaged, our main focus of moral attention is on those 
who are so disadvantaged as to be compromised in the enjoyment of the most basic 
human rights. (Hence we are not concerned here to offer fine-grained analysis of 
economic strata that might be regarded as marginally advantaged or disadvantaged.) 
Insofar as severe disadvantage is manifest in inadequate access to resources – which 
we understood comprehensively in terms of ecological space, and thus as including 
environmental conditions as well as more conventional social goods – the relevant 
thresholds have been quite thoroughly discussed in the literature of global justice. 
Exactly how the temporal dimension should figure, though, is not so well understood. 
 
3. Three categories of global time injustices 
We have acknowledged Hornborg’s suggestion that time-space compression 
presupposes time-space appropriation, but while we have understood what it means 
for the tangible components of ecological space to be subject to appropriation, it 
remains to clarify how time enters a picture that can be normatively assessed. We 
referred earlier to temporal differentiation, but we need to consider more carefully 
now what this might mean. 
 Something about inequality in relation to time is that we should not expect it 
to show up as conspicuously and clearly as inequality in relation to tangible resources 
can. Therefore situations of temporal injustice may be harder to recognise and 
diagnose. The richest person alive can make only marginally more of their allotted 
time on this earth than the average person can; but the worst off can have an 
unutterably miserable time on earth. These observations point to an extraordinary 
asymmetry: however many millions or even billions of people might be driven into 
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effective servitude with all prospect of any free or rewarding time removed from them, 
the rich minority can never make a remotely equivalent gain for themselves. As with 
the unacknowledged damage to ecological systems, there is a sheer waste of lived 
temporality under conditions of extreme time-space inequality.  
 Our aim in this section is to set out more explicitly what we mean by 
deprivation in relation to time. We shall highlight three broad categories of global 
time injustices that can arise under the existing global system. Doing so will enable us 
to grasp a fuller picture of the current circumstances of global inequality. 
 (a) Deprivation of a source of social wealth: Two sources of social wealth that 
are potentially conducive to the end of human well-being (e.g. continued life, bodily 
health, bodily integrity, etc.) are ecological space and the time people spend for 
socially productive purposes, i.e. labour time.  
 As we explained above, the inter-societal exchange of ecological space and 
labour time is governed by the dynamic mechanism through which industrialised 
societies gain ever greater access to those resources while underdeveloped societies 
are left with less development potential. The ultimate beneficiaries of this exchange 
process are those who gain the economic power to use/occupy/command the fruits of 
the resources under the existing economic system. Meanwhile, the poor are liable to 
be excluded from the benefits of ecological space or/and exploited as sources of cheap 
and long labour. Under the existing global system, in short, labour time is exchanged 
in such a way as to benefit the Global Affluent while leaving the Global Poor without 
material means adequate for subsistence. 
 (b) Deprivation of discretionary time: Besides the economic aspect as a 
potential source of social wealth, human time has another important – personal – 
aspect as a prerequisite for a person to lead an autonomous life. ‘Autonomy’ – the 
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human capacity to choose one’s path through life in accordance with one’s own life 
plans, projects or goals – is an important human value, not simply because the 
empirical evidence shows that many people actually desire to lead an autonomous life 
(cf. Peterson 1999; Veenhoven 1999), but also because the possibility of doing so 
allows humans to develop and reflexively apply their highest emergent faculties and 
capacities. Therefore, societies should not suppress such fundamental human 
capacities but aim at supporting a state of affairs in which individuals can lead an 
autonomous life that allows their full unfolding.  
 Time has an important implication for this central human value of autonomy 
and the capacities of practical reasoning. As Robert Goodin (2010, p. 2) points out, 
‘whatever plans or projects one might care to pursue, without time to devote to them 
an absolutely essential input would be missing’. So, a person needs a certain amount 
of time that is not dictated by such ‘necessities of life’ as personal care, labour for the 
accumulation of social wealth, etc., i.e. what Goodin calls ‘discretionary time’; and 
those who are substantially (or even completely) deprived of ‘discretionary time’ can 
be said to lack an important aspect of autonomy, i.e. what Goodin calls ‘temporal 
autonomy’ (one’s discretionary control over one’s own time) (cf. also Goodin et al 
2008, pp. 27-36). 
 Under the existing global system, people in one class, the Global Affluent, are 
gaining extensive command over material means of life, while those in another class, 
the Global Poor, are exploited as sources of cheap and long labour or deprived 
otherwise of their secure access to ecological space, and thereby left without material 
means adequate for subsistence. Those who lack material means of subsistence are 
temporally disadvantaged too, because they are in the position where they need to 
devote most of their time to trying to eke out any means of life and thereby lose a 
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decent amount of discretionary time. Meanwhile, those who have extensive command 
over material means of life are able to employ those means to fill the time they have 
under their discretionary control; in this sense, they have extensive temporal 
autonomy.  
 (c) Deprivation of the physical requirements for human life in time: The most 
basic relation to time for human beings is their physiological dependence on the time 
necessary for a broad range of reproductive processes, from the reproduction of 
individual body – i.e. the maintenance of physical well-being (continued life 
supported by bodily health and integrity) – to reproduction in the generative sense. A 
person, more specifically, needs time for personal care (e.g. resting, eating, bathing, 
procuring material means of subsistence, etc.), on the one hand, and time for familial 
care (e.g. birthing and rearing of a child, caring activities for other dependants, etc.), 
on the other. Also, another temporal factor to consider in relation to the physical well-
being of humans is that they, as mortal beings, live temporal lifespans of certain 
length. Deprivation of the time necessary for these activities affects the poor in many 
ways, including the following ways.  
 First, the poverty and environmental degradation attributable (at least partly) 
to the existing global system can affect the time the poor need for the maintenance of 
their physical well-being by increasing the time they need for procuring means of 
subsistence, or, in the worst case, by reducing the length of their lifespan. This seems 
to be the case in the current global state of affairs in which a large number of people 
lack secure access to food, clean water, basic sanitation, adequate shelter and essential 
medicines (or medical care), or die as a result of poverty or air pollution (UNDP 1998, 
p. 25; 2006, pp. 33, 174; WHO 2014; cf. also Pogge 2008, pp. 2-3).  
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 Secondly, some of those industrial commodities from which we are benefiting 
as consumers may be produced through such processes that impose unhealthy or 
unsafe working conditions upon the poor.3 These working conditions are likely to 
cause time deprivation by prolonging the time the victims will need for personal care 
(and thereby also reducing their discretionary time as well): those who suffer ill health 
or bodily damage have to spend more time (and energy) on sleep, curing, recovery, 
medical care, rehabilitation, etc., than they would otherwise need to. Also, because 
humans are sentient beings, damage to bodily health and integrity can shorten the 
victims’ temporal lifespan.  
 Thirdly, many of those in extreme poverty are subject to such inhumane 
working conditions as forced labour or child labour. According to ILO reports (2010, 
p. 13; 2012, p. 1; 2013, p. vii), the total number of forced labourers globally amounts 
to 20.9 million, while 168 million children are the victims of child labour.4 Forced 
labourers and child labourers are particularly vulnerable to such physical threat that 
can prolong the time they need for personal care or cut short their temporal lifespan, 
since they lack any choice (and voice) with regard to their working conditions. 
Noteworthy is that the temporal disadvantage of forced or child labourers can be 
compounded by the lack of choice about their occupations (i.e. the lack of temporal 
autonomy about the activities to which they will direct their labour time in the first 
place), and the deprivation of their labour time in such a way as to leave them without 
sufficient means of subsistence. In addition to these, child labourers are also deprived 
of a temporal precondition necessary for their enjoyment of a fulfilled life in 
adulthood: the time they need for developing their mental and emotional faculties and 
the skills they can rely on for future occupations (i.e. time for play, education, etc.).  
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 Finally, with regard to the use of time for familial care, there is an issue of 
gender inequality that should not be overlooked. Women, in pretty much every 
culture, rich or poor, have to spend far more time than men engaged in activities 
necessary for the well-being of their children and other dependants. Also, because the 
less infrastructure, technology, and resources there are at one’s disposal, the more one 
has to do oneself; the harder are the conditions, the more there is to do in the first 
place. It is possible, then, to argue that, while women will generally have more of 
their time put to the end of familial care than men, poor women are liable to fare even 
worse than poor men. This is also likely to register in stresses on mental health for 
people who quite literally spend all their time worrying about how their families are 
going to get by from one day to the next. 
 We see categories (a) through (c) as describing the circumstances of ‘time 
injustice’, the injustice which occurs through the mediation of time deprivation in 
various forms – among which we focused on (a) deprivation of labour time, (b) 
deprivation of discretionary time (necessary for an autonomous life), and (c) 
deprivation of the time necessary for the physical well-being of humans. These are 
circumstances of time injustice since, as we shall see shortly, these infringe upon 
Henry Shue’s tripartite set of basic human rights that we take as the benchmark of 
justice and injustice.  
 
4. How the temporal perspective deepens the understanding of the human rights 
that provide criteria of global justice 
The temporal perspective, we would therefore argue, is no less important than the 
ecological perspective for understanding the circumstances and requirements of 
justice. By adding temporal considerations into the analysis of the conditions of 
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justice and injustice, in the circumstances of radical inequality and ecological 
overshoot globally, we may attain a more complete picture of how the compound 
advantages of some are pressed and enjoyed at the expense of corresponding 
compound disadvantages endured by others. In particular, the analysis helps deepen 
the conceptual link between the substantive purposes of human rights and the more 
impersonal demands of justice. For while the ecological perspective allows us to 
theorise how institutionalised norms of rights regimes can favour mere rights of 
property over human rights, the temporal perspective allows us to see more fully what 
those claims of human right are grounded in and consist of. 
 We may take as a moral benchmark for identifying the wrongness of the 
various kinds of temporal deprivation the idea of basic rights as influentially 
presented by Henry Shue in terms of rights whose enjoyment is a precondition for any 
other rights at all. We will show that the three kinds of temporal deprivation closely 
map onto the three areas of human need and well-being that Shue categorises as 
subsistence, liberty and security. 
 (a) Deprivation of a source of social wealth:- The use of time in contributing 
to social production relates to basic rights of subsistence: time is expended on these 
activities by an autonomous agent in order to provide (at least) subsistence for 
him/herself and those he/she has responsibilities for or towards. In more affluent 
economies, people may labour to achieve a quality of life well above subsistence, but 
the human rights issue concerns preventing people from falling below that line: when 
the fruits of their labour are expropriated to leave them below that line, there is a 
violation of human rights and an injustice. This deprivation can also materially occur 
through the medium of ecological marginalisation: the more marginal one’s 
subsistence conditions, the more time one has to devote to trying to eke out any kind 
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of living at all. In that case, the rights violation is not a result of direct expropriation 
of fruits of labour but it may be mediated through the property relations that allow 
occupation by others of needed access to ecological resources. 
 (b) Deprivation of discretionary time:- The value of time for the exercise of 
individual autonomy relates to the basic rights associated with liberty. Empirical 
research into the nature of poverty tends to emphasise the importance of autonomous 
time for the living of even a minimally decent human life (Boltvinik 1998). In that 
respect, the deprivation of temporal autonomy over discretionary time is a 
consequence, or part, of the deprivation of time as a source of social wealth. More 
directly, for people to be kept in conditions where they have no freedom at all from 
demands of labour is already recognised to be a violation of human rights as through 
slavery or servitude. Understanding the integral and constitutive significance of time 
for the exercise of autonomy helps in understanding, substantively, what makes a 
circumstance bad in such a way that we may regard it as a violation of human right.  
 (c) Deprivation of the physical requirements for human life in time:- Time 
necessary for individual health and survival relates to basic rights of personal security. 
The amount of time in a lifespan that an individual has for the leading of a minimally 
decent and healthy life is something that is strongly influenced by social and 
ecological conditions, and certain minimal conditions of health and welfare are 
already recognised as human rights. Lives that are cut short through violence or 
preventable disease may be subject to violations of subsistence and liberty rights, but 
there is additionally a dimension of personal security that is thereby violated. 
 So we believe that consideration of the temporal dimension contributes to 
fleshing out the requirements of human rights, particularly in establishing thresholds 
for basic rights. This framing would also support further analysis addressing 
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problematic questions. For instance, we know that people who live in affluence may 
often be time-poor but we would not want to say they are victims of radical 
inequality, inequality of an egregiously unjust kind: by distinguishing the various 
ways in which temporality can affect individual well-being and be affected by social 
relations, a suitably nuanced approach can be taken towards such questions.  
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that injustices relating to unequal access to material means of life can 
be compounded by temporal injustices. Advantages with respect to the use, 
occupation or command of ecological space can be leveraged to secure advantages 
over others with respect to time; meanwhile, disadvantages of time can lead to further 
disadvantages of access to ecological space, and thus there is a vicious circle. Such a 
dynamic appears actually to be at work in the world today; at the very least, it seems 
to us, those who think normatively about global justice should take seriously the 
possibility that this is so. When theorising global justice, we certainly suggest, the 
problem of temporal justice should not be siloed off as a question predominantly 
concerning responsibilities of this generation with regard to the future: it is a problem 
of the reality and trajectory of the contemporary dynamic relationships of advantage 
and disadvantage in the global economy. We believe there is good reason to be 
cautious about the prospect of economic and technical progress being the basis for a 
more just future for the world’s population. The dynamic of that progress could 
conceivably lead to future people benefiting from the human ingenuity that goes into 
converting ecological processes into human-constructed assets, and in perpetuity; but 
whether that will happen is another matter. Meanwhile, temporal justice is not only 
about the future, and we know that time will run out for individuals on the wrong end 
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of global inequality before any benefit might ensue, and their children will be 
orphaned into poverty. We know this, because it is already happening. 
 Were there but world enough, and time, the worst off could perhaps wait for 
the promised effects of trickle down that provide the only warrant for suggesting that 
the global economy is merely imperfectly just rather than profoundly unjust in its core 
structures. The problem is, there is not. 
 
 
                                                        
Notes 
1. The term ‘temporal differentiation’ is intended here to indicate an area of inquiry rather 
than to name a component of a theory. There are more specific concepts that would be 
instances of such inquiry, an early influential one being the Ungleichzeitigkeit of Ernst 
Bloch (1962). 
2. Hornborg uses the term ‘natural space’, but we go with the term ecological space for 
reasons set out in work by Hayward (e.g. 2013, 2014). With the renaming we do not 
intend any significant amendment of Hornborg’s argument. 
3. Recently, UNIQLO has been reported to have imposed such unfavourable working 
conditions on its factory workers in China (Nikkei Asian Review 2015). 
4. We are aware, for instance, that some multinational corporations such as NIKE, Gap 
and Nestlé are alleged to have employed child labour or forced labour at some points in 
their production chains (BBC 2000, 2010). 
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